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The Canadian Labour Congress 
and Tripartism 
Anthony Giles 
After having addressed the concept of tripartism and the is-
sues of corporatism and incomes policies, the author examines the 
background to the imposition ofcontrois and the subséquent tri-
partism debate. Finally, the author focuses on the main stages in 
the négociations over controis and tripartism, with particular ré-
férence to major shifts in CLC policy and strategy. 
The imposition of mandatory wage and price controls in 1975 by the 
Canadian fédéral government touched off a remarkable séries of events. 
Both in public and in private, and with varying degrees of enthusiasm and 
commitment, leaders of the Canadian Labour Congress, the business com-
munity, and the fédéral government became entangled in a protracted séries 
of negotiations aimed at replacing controls with some form of "tripar-
tism". Although thèse negotiations eventually failed in bringing controls 
to an early end, the issue of "tripartism'', if not the term itself, has proved 
surprisingly résilient and continues to be played out. This paper will ex-
amine the events and processes surrounding the debate on tripartism and 
wage controls, primarily from the perspective of the policies and stratégies 
adopted by the CLC. This focus will allow a clarification of some of the ma-
jor déterminants of CLC policy, and in so doing will highlight those factors 
which hâve tended to propell the CLC leadership towards acceptance of 
"tripartism" and voluntary incomes policies, and those factors which con-
stitue a significant barrier to such a course. 
The term "tripartism" has, in Canada, had attached to it various 
meanings, leading to a certain degree of ambiguity and confusion. Thus, in 
the first section of the paper, the concept of tripartism will be briefly ad-
dressed, as will be the related issues of "corporatism" and incomes policies. 
The background to the imposition of controls and the subséquent tripartism 
debate will be outlined in the second section. The remainder of the paper 
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will trace the main stages in the negotiations over controls and tripartism, 
with particular référence to major shifts in CLC policy and strategy,, as well 
as to the critical points of agreement and disagreement between the partici-
pants. The paper will conclude with a summary of the major forces which 
influenced the CLC's rôle in the process, and an assessment of their likely 
impact on future initiatives. 
For the sake of explicitness — and at the concomitant risk of over-
simplification — the various catégories of factors which are hère presumed 
to shape the policies and stratégies of trade union confédérations (and hâve 
thus guided the research) should be mentioned. Any account of the policies 
and stratégies pursued by trade union confédérations must take into consi-
dération macro-societal forces and developments, which, in this case, gave 
rise to the issues of wage controls and tripartism in the first instance. Within 
this context it is important to take account of certain other factors: the 
"leadership logic" underlying décisions (i.e. the constellation of personal 
and institutional interests, as shaped by societal constraints on trade union 
action); the shifting stances of other participants in the negotiations; and 
conflict stemming from the political crosscurrents within the Congress1. 
TRIPARTISM, CORPORATISM AND INCOMES POLICIES 
Expressed at its most gênerai level tripartism is usually taken to mean 
some form of organized labour-government-business interaction and co-
opération which, in the first instance, can be distinguished from the equally 
gênerai notion of interest group relations (involving separate processes of 
government-labour and government-business interaction). It is immediately 
obvious, however, that this gênerai conceptualization of tripartism obscures 
a broad range of possible forms. A number of criteria may be adduced to 
distinguish between various tripartite arrangments2: the degree of institu-
tionalization; the extent to which the participants are considered as formally 
représentative of their respective organizations; the particular issues under 
considération, and the depth in which they are dealt with; the extent to 
which a "consensus" is being sought; the extent to which the participants 
i This paper is largely based on the author's MA thesis, The Politics of Wage Controls: 
The Canadian State, Organized Labour and Corporatism, 1975-1978, Ottawa, School of 
Public Administration, Carleton University, 1980. The author would like to thank the follow-
ing people for their invaluable aid and advice — William Brown, G. Bruce Doern, Rianne 
Mahon, Gregor Murray, Gène Swimmer, Stéphanie Tailby, and David Winchester. Many of 
the sources on which this article is based (interviews and documents) must remain confidential. 
2 The following are specifically related to important criteria involved in the case dis-
cussed in the paper; a more complète model would be considerably more complicated. 
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undertake to ensure the compliance of their members to any agreed policy; 
the involvement of the non-governmental groups in policy administration; 
and so on. Thus, at one extrême tripartism can be taken to mean an institu-
tionalized political structure involving regular meetings of government, 
business and labour leaders to discuss and formulate aspects of, for exam-
ple, économie, industrial relations or manpower policy; undertake to ensure 
their constituents' adhérence to the agreed policies; and are involved in the 
actual administration of the policies. At the other extrême, tripartism can 
be taken to mean simply an informai or ad hoc forum wherein discussions 
between the groups take place with no expectation or objective beyond the 
exchange of "viewpoints" (and the hope of somehow influencing each 
others actions). 
While thèse static distinctions are useful in highlighting the differing 
conceptions and goals underlying various proposais for tripartism, they are 
less useful in explaining the marked upsurge in interest about tripartite 
forms of représentation in a number of countries, and the relationship of 
tripartism to the issue of incomes policy. To help understand thèse broader, 
dynamic aspects of the Canadian debate on wage controls and tripartism it 
will be useful to deal briefly with the concept of corporatisme 
One influential treatment of corporatism has defined it as "a political 
structure within advanced capitalism which intégrâtes organized socio-
economic producer groups through a System of représentation and coopéra-
tive mutual interaction at the leadership level and mobilization and social 
control at the mass level"4. For présent purposes, two important distinc-
tions can be drawn between this définition of corporatism and the concept 
of tripartism outlined above. First, it is clear that corporatism implies a tri-
partite arrangement roughly paralleling the first of the ' 'extrême" forms 
suggested above, but does not include those forms of tripartism which are 
largely "consultative" and not involved in policy formulation. Second, the 
association of corporatism with "advanced capitalism" and the référence to 
its integrative function raises the critical questions of the political and 
économie context, as well as the underlying purpose of corporatist arrange-
ments. The remainder of this section will briefly consider thèse questions in 
order to situate the Canadian debate in its wider setting. 
3 The discussion of corporatism presented hère is extremely simplifiée; in particular it 
concentrâtes on the establishment of corporatist arrangements and ignores the many complexi-
ties involved in the actual functioning of thèse institutions. Fuller treatments are to be found in 
the various essays in Philippe C. SCHMITTER and Gerhard LEHMBRUCH, eds, Trends 
Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London, Sage Publications, 1979, 328 p. 
4 PANITCH, Léo, "The Development of Corporatism in Libéral Democracies", Com-
parative Political Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, April 1977, pp. 61-90, p. 66. 
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Simplifying somewhat, corporatist proposais or arrangements hâve 
typically been made as a direct conséquence of a perceived need to secure 
wage restraint — either through explicit voluntary incomes policies (e.g. in 
Britain in 1975-77) or through more informai arrangements (e.g. in West 
Germany and Sweden). Although the exact content of various arrangements 
has varied, they hâve usually involved some form of "économie planning" 
through the establishment of consultative, advisory or decision-making 
bodies on which organized labour is given formai représentation in return 
for a commitment to wage restraint. Depending on the relative strength of 
the groups, the arrangement may involve certain governmental commit-
ments to spécifie policies advocated by organized labour and/or business. 
Additionally, the "typical" corporatist arrangement or proposai has usual-
ly been associated with a particular set of assumptions concerning the 
economy, the main lines of which may be briefly summarized. 
The gênerai problem is seen as the deleterious effect of unrestrained 
wage militancy on the price level, and consequently on international com-
petitiveness5. For various reasons — ranging from a professed cornmitment 
to full employment, to a growing appréciation of the limited effects of 
deflationary policies — governments hâve, particularly since the miid- 1960s, 
seen incomes policies as a "solution". Incomes policies, then, although 
proffered in the "national interest", hâve as their main purpose the 
achievement of wage restraint; and, to the extent that a purpose can be im-
puted from a fairly consistent resuit, as a secondary purpose the shifting of 
national income from wages to profits. 
Politically, it is much more désirable to attain a voluntary commitment 
by trade unions to an incomes policy rather than to impose mandatory con-
trols. However, trade unions hâve been understandably hésitant — both in 
view of the obviously overriding emphasis of incomes policies on wage 
restraint, and as a conséquence of the fact that wage bargaining is a crucial 
élément in the raison d'être of trade unionism. Governments, when faced 
with this hesitancy, hâve attempted to win the consent of trade union 
leaders not only through promises of price restraint but also by offering the 
quidpro quo of some form of "tripartism" — approaching, in some cases, 
the "idéal" of corporatism, but more usually falling somewhat short6. 
5 The wage level, of course, is not seen as the only influence on the price level and inter-
national competitiveness. 
6 Corporatist proposais hâve by no means been universally successful, and in the con-
clusion of the paper conditions for success will be discussed. In addition, corporatist arrange-
ments, particularly those linked to explicit voluntary incomes policies, hâve proven to be highly 
unstable. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that incomes policies as an important policy alternative 
will be removed from the agenda in the near future. 
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Tripartism, then, as used in Canada, refers to any of a fairly broad 
variety of arrangements involving labour-government-business "consulta-
tion"; corporatism, for the purposes of this paper, refers more specifically 
to those tripartite arrangements which involve the groups in policy formula-
tion, and in ensuring that their constituents adhère to the agreements. How-
ever, in view of the main purpose of this paper, whether or not a particular 
proposai meets the exact définition of corporatism is relatively immaterial; 
much more important is the gênerai association between tripartism and in-
comes policies, and their significance to trade unions. 
PRELUDE TO CONTROLS: THE TURNER CONSENSUS EXERCISE 
During the 1960s and early 1970s the issue of inflation and incomes 
policy was examined by several bodies, including the National Productivity 
Council, the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, the Economie 
Council of Canada, the Task Force on Labour Relations, the Priées and In-
comes Commission, and the Senate Committee on Banking and Finance. 
The only serious attempt to achieve a voluntary incomes policy was that of 
the Priées and Incomes Commission in 1969-707. This attempt, coming on 
the heels of the failure of the government's deflationary policies in 1967-68 
to significantly reduce the rate of inflation, foundered on the opposition of 
the CLC and the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux. The government 
reconsidered formulating an incomes policy in 1973, but again rejected the 
idea. 
Then in the context of the highest rate of inflation since the Korean 
war, the issue regained prominence during the élection campaign held in the 
Spring of 1973 (see Table 1). 
One of the most contentious issues of that campaign was the Conserva-
tive party's proposai for a mandatory wage and price control programme, a 
proposai which Pierre Trudeau and the Libéral party campaigned vigorous-
ly against. Heaping ridicule on the Conservative's plan, Trudeau claimed 
that controls would be "unjust" and had never been successful in other 
countries. Trudeau's arguments during the campaign paralleled the then-
dominant view of the fédéral Department of Finance, namely, that the cur-
rent inflation was the product of largely international factors and that, con-
sequently, a domestic incomes policy was inappropriate. 
7 See G. BERGER, Canada's Expérience with Incomes Policy, 1969-70, Ottawa, Priées 
and Incomes Commission, 1973, 86 p., and George HAYTHORNE, "Priées and Incomes 
Policy: The Canadian Expérience, 1969-72", International Labour Review, vol. 108, no. 6, 
December 1973, pp. 485-503. 
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TABLE I 
Inflation, Unemployment and Wage Seulement, 1973-1978 
nd CPI Rate Unemployment Increase in Wage Settlements 
er of Change Rate Commercial Non-Commercial 
(%) (%) (*) (%) 
I 6.0 5.5 9.4 7.3 
II 8.1 5.3 9.0 8.3 
III 5.5 6.0 10.2 8.9 
IV 9.1 5.4 9.1 11.7 
I 10.4 5.4 11.6 8.3 
II 11.4 4.9 9.9 9.3 
III 10.9 5.5 10.3 9.3 
IV 12.4 6.0 9.1 11.2 
I 11.3 7.2 16.7 18.7 
II 10.3 7.2 15.1 23.1 
III 10.6 7.2 13.0 20.8 
IV 9.5 7.0 14.9 13.6 
I 9.0 6.8 12.5 16.0 
II 7.8 7.0 10.3 11.3 
III 6.5 7.2 8.9 9.6 
IV 5.8 7.5 7.2 8.5 
I 7.4 8.1 8.0 8.6 
II 7.8 7.9 7.6 8.3 
III 8.4 8.3 7.5 7.4 
IV 9.5 8.5 8.1 6.4 
I 8.8 8.6 6.9 6.3 
II 9.2 8.5 6.4 6.6 
III 8.6 8.5 7.1 6.8 
IV 8.4 8.1 8.5 7.0 
Source: Allan M. MASLOVE and Gène SWIMMER, Wage Controls in Canada, 1975-78: A 
Study of Public Décision Making, Montréal, The Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1980, 182 p., p. 17. 
Following the élection, however, concern mounted over inflation; the 
Finance Department's view shifted to concern with domestic cost-push fac-
tors; and by September the government was laying plans to seek a "national 
consensus about what the various groups can safely take from the economy 
over the next few years". Twenty-three meetings were held between January 
and March 1975, five with the labour movement (one each with the CLC, 
CSN, CSD, the Building Trades and the Teamsters), nine with various 
groups of business executives, and the remainder with groups representing 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
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other "interests" (professionals, consumers, agriculturalists, and such 
like). The discussions during this first round remained purposely gênerai, 
and in the end the government concluded that although there was disagree-
ment on some issues (notably, and portentously, on the best way to promote 
private investment), there was sufficient unanimity on the need to "take ac-
tion against inflation" to warrant further discussions. 
In early April several cabinet ministers presented the CLC Executive 
Committee8 with a relatively detailed proposai concerning wage and salary 
restraint, and a more gênerai proposai for limiting business profits, profes-
sional fées and rents. The ministers and the Executive Committee agreed to 
establish a joint working group composed of senior staff from each side to 
deal with the "technical aspects" of the proposai. The working group met 
several times during April and it quickly became apparent, that, while both 
the government and Congress could agrée on the objective of restraining in-
flation, their respective views diverged considerably on the means. First, the 
Congress was unhappy about the apparent bias of the government's propo-
sais, that is, the fact that the proposai concentrated on outlining wage and 
salary restraints, and paid only vague attention to profit and price control. 
Second, although accepting the need for wage and salary restraint in the 
context of an overall programme, the CLC negotiators objected to the lack 
of equity inhérent in the government proposai; specifically, the applicability 
of the proposed percentage limits to ail levels of income. On this matter the 
Congress presented a counterproposal: that a négative income tax or tax 
crédit be given to ail those whose earnings fell below the industrial compo-
site, and that an upper limit be attached to permissible salary increases. In 
addition to thèse central criticisms the Congress représentatives opposed the 
concept of tax concessions to bolster investment (unless the concessions 
were attached to spécifie re-investment projects), raised the question of 
priées determined on world markets, expressed concern over mortgage and 
consumer interest rates, and sought assurance that the provincial govern-
ments would act on rents, professional fées and land spéculation. 
8 The Executive Committee is composed of the four full-time officers and six gênerai 
vice-présidents (usually the leaders of the largest affiliâtes). The Executive Council is composed 
of the members of the Executive Committee, ten vice-présidents, and the ten provincial vice-
présidents (the présidents of the provincial Fédérations of Labour). The other important 
decision-making level to which référence will be made is occasional meetings of ranking of-
ficers — the leaders of ail the affiliated unions. In this paper, "the leadership" of the Congress 
refers to the Executive Committee and the most important staff members. This group, of 
course, is not homogeneous. Indeed, one of the full-time officers was opposed to tripartism; 
and several members of the Executive Committee at least publicly stated their misgivings 
(largely due to the internai politics of their own unions). 
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On 1 May the government responded to the CLC's concerns by pro-
posing that, notwithstanding the percentage guidelines, a $600 minimum in-
crease was to be allowed in ail cases and $2,400 was to be the upper limit. 
This concession fell considerably short of the Congress's previous counter 
proposai, and the CLC negotiators reported to the officers that the govern-
ment seemed preoccupied with achieving wage restraint and little else. In the 
view of the negotiators, the programme as it stood then did not offer suffi-
cient concessions to warrant agreement to restrain wage income. 
Then, on 6 May the Executive Council met to prépare for a ranking of-
ficers meeting scheduled for the foliowing day. At the Council meeting, 
CLC président Joe Morris, apparently argued in favour of the controls pro-
gramme, or, at least, in favour of continuing discussions9. However, résis-
tance proved too strong and the Council drafted a statement for the ranking 
officers meeting which effectively closed the door on voluntary restraint10. 
Although technically leaving open the possibility of further discussions, the 
statement stressed that the exercise had so far revealed a bias against wage 
earners, and made the continuation of discussions contingent on the consi-
dération of a broad range of other policies11. Despite at least one subséquent 
meeting later on in the month, the consensus exercise had corne to an abrupt 
end. 
Two significant lines of conflict seem to hâve split the Executive Coun-
cil. One line of division ran between the public and private sector unions12. 
This split was a conséquence of the relative gains at the time of public sector 
wages, and the growing conviction of government decision-makers, busi-
ness spokespersons, and some pivate-sector union officiais, that public sec-
tor wage increases were a prime source of inflation. (See Table 1) Thus, the 
public sector leaders voiced strong opposition to voluntary restraint, with 
some private sector leaders lining up on the side of continuing discussions. 
Not ail private sector leaders favoured restraint, however, for the deep com-
9 MASLOVE, Allan and Gène SWIMMER, Wage Controls in Canada, 1975-78: A 
Study of Public Décision Making, Montréal, The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 
1980, 182 p., argue that Morris and other Congress leaders supported the actual guidelines pro-
posed by the government. 
10 CLC, Executive Council Statement Prepared for Meeting of Ranking Officers of 
Canadian Labour Congress, Ottawa, 7 May 1975. 
n Thèse other policies comprised the "Nine-Point Programme" (later expanded to a 
"Ten-Point Programme"). The nine points included: housing supply; rent controls; control of 
land spéculation; régulation of oil and gas priées; négative income tax or tax crédit System; full 
employment policies; professional fées; pension increases; and the linking of corporate tax 
concessions to spécifie investment proposais. 
12 See MASLOVE and SWIMMER, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
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mitment of "free collective bargaining" and affiliate autonomy made the 
idea of voluntary restraint répugnant to a significant group. 
One other factor contributed to the décision: the publication of the 
leaked 1 May proposais in the Toronto Star on 5 May probably hardened 
the positions of the Congress and the government (compromise being di-
gestible in private, but tending to stick in the throat if carried out publicly), 
and certainly aroused the fears of the ranking officers before the supporters 
of restraint could put their case. However, the basic cause of the CLC's 
refusai was the opposition of the public sector unions, and of those most 
committed to free collective bargaining. Besides, had not Trudeau cam-
paigned against a mandatory programme? 
The failure of the Turner consensus exercise draws attention to several 
important points. The government's actions accorded fairly well with the 
view of the development of corporatism outlined above. Based on the pre-
mise that wage increases, especially in the public sector, were significantly 
contributing to the level of inflation, and that this in turn was damaging in-
ternational competitiveness, the government proposed a voluntary restraint 
programme. Although the clear objective was to restrain wages, the govern-
ment also offered price restraint, suggested that organized labour be repre-
sented in the programme's administration, and also undertook to initiate 
tripartite discussions on labour-management relations. 
While the Congress représentatives most closely connected with the 
negotiations — the full-time officers and staff — obviously accepted the 
fact (but not the form) of an incomes policy, they were unable to convince 
the major affiliâtes to go along. Broadly, the government's concessions 
were simply "not enough". But more specifically, the opposition of the 
large public sector unions, and the hesitancy of those most committed to 
free collective bargaining to relinquish their primary base of power, proved 
too great — especially in light of the government's avowed commitment to 
avoid a mandatory programme. 
THE CLC ON THE WARPATH: THE INITIAL RESPONSE TO CONTROLS 
Following the breakdown of the consensus exercise, the fédéral govern-
ment grew increasingly concerned with inflation, and over the summer and 
early autumn decided to institute mandatory controls. The programme, an-
nounced on 13 October, was to last three years and was to be administered 
by an independent Anti-Inflation Board. Allowable wage increases were to 
décline from 8-12 per cent in the first year, to 6-10 per cent in the second, 
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and to 4-8 per cent in the third. (The variations within each year being deter-
mined according to previous gains and losses around a norm.) A $600 mini-
mum increase was to be allowed in ail cases, and $2,400 was to be the maxi-
mum. Priées were to be controlled through limitations on profits13. 
The Congress's public response to controls was hostile and vociferous. 
Within several weeks the ranking officers had ratified an Executive Council 
policy statement condemning controls, and reiterating the ten-point pro-
gramme of the previous May14. Also adopted was a Programme of Action 
outlining the objectives and means to guide a "nation-wide campaign to 
fight the injustice of the législation now before parliament"15. The Con-
gress, it seemed, was intent on oiling the rusty wheels of political protest. 
A close reading of the policy statement, and other Congress state-
ments16, reveals that the CLC's principal objections were four: that the go-
vernment had imposed controls without attempting to continue discussions; 
that the provisions for wage and salary controls did not adequately protect 
the real income of unionists and peopie on low or fixed incomes; that the 
programme did not encourage income redistribution; and that priées would 
not be adequately controlled. Further, although the Congress warned that 
"the labour movement is not prepared to accept Bill C-73 in principle or in 
practice", it also claimed that it "will in the future be prepared to seek solu-
tions in coopération with government and industry". 
The Congress's campaign against controls consisted of several activi-
ties. First, a publicity campaign was launched to explain organized labour's 
position to its membership and to the public at large. The campaign slogan 
— "Why Me?" — did not meet with resounding success and was eventually 
replaced by a "Price Watch" campaign. Second, between November 1975 
and March 1976, almost 200 meetings and seminars were organized by, or 
coordinated with, the CLC campaign team. Third, a fund raising drive ini-
13 For a discussion of the fédéral government's décision and a fuller description of the 
programme see MASLOVE and SWIMMER, op. cit., and AIB, Chronicles of the Anti-
Inflation Board, Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services, 1979. The actual opération of the 
controls programme will not be discussed further in any détail; suffice it to say that, not sur-
prisingly, wages were restrained much more than profits. See Reginald S. LÉTOURNEAU, 
"Inflation and Incomes Policy in Canada", Conférence Board in Canada Executive Bulletin 
no. 9, May 1979. 
14 CLC, Policy Statement Adopted by the Executive Council of the Canadian Labour 
Congress on the Fédéral Government's Wage and Price Control Programme, 24 October 1975. 
15 CLC, Canadian Labour Congress Programme of Action, Re. Anti-Inflation, 24 Oc-
tober 1975. 
16 CLC, Submission to the Committee on Finance, Trade and Economie Affairs on Bill 
C-73 (An Act to Provide for the Restraint on Profit Margins, Priées, Dividends and Compen-
sation in Canada) by the Canadian Labour Congress, 18 November 1975. 
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tiated to finance the campaign raised about $220,000 by February. Fourth, 
légal advice was retained to investigate the possibility of a court challenge to 
the controls législation17. Fifth, vis-à-vis the administration of the controls 
programme, the Congress and its affiliâtes refused to nominate labour re-
présentatives to the AIB; generally refused to second staff to the Board; and 
refused to participate in AIB informational seminars. And, finally, the 
CLC advised its affiliâtes that in line with the announced policy of ignoring 
the controls programme, "normal collective bargaining" should be contin-
ued. Under pressure from union negotiators, however, this tactic was tacitly 
abandoned after a short time. 
The range of activities enumerated above seem to hâve only marginally 
contributed to the growth of reaction against controls which appeared to 
gain strength in the early months of 1976. Indeed, in retrospect the Con-
gress's Director of Législation, Ron Lang, has argued that there was a 
growing "credibility gap" between the leadership and the rank-and-file, 
since the leadership was not successful in proposing a viable alternative to 
controls18. Perhaps the most important factor responsible for galvanizing 
opposition to controls was the actions of the AIB itself. Maslove and 
Swimmer hâve argued that the hésitant and conciliatory start of the AIB 
was replaced, after a period of consolidation, by a tougher line19. In addi-
tion, as it was not until April 1976 that the first price actions were an-
nounced, there was a growing perception that the Board was biased against 
wage increases. If there was a "cause célèbre,' during this period it was the 
outcome of the AIB's review of the Canadian Paperworkers Union agree-
ment with Irving; for the Board not only rolled the seulement back from 
23.8per cent to 14.0 per cent, but also ordered the workers to repay the "ex-
cess payments" (since the contract as originally negotiated had been imple-
mented immediately). This case provoked angry reaction and is generally 
held to hâve been instrumental in generating opposition to the pro-
gramme20. 
n The eventual légal challenge is dealt with in Peter RUSSELL, "The Anti-Inflation 
Case: The Anatomy of a Constitutional Décision", Canadian Public Administration, vol. 20, 
no. 4, Winter 1975, pp. 632-665. 
18 LANG, Ronald W., "Remarks to the Conférence Board in Canada's Session on 'For-
mal Consultation: A New Era in Public Policy Formulation?" at the Conférence on Consul-
tation and Advocacy: Influencing Public Policy, Ottawa, November 20, 1979. Also see the 
remarks of Lang and others in CONFERENCE BOARD IN CANADA, Consultation and 
Consensus: A New Era in Policy Formulation?, A Round Table Discussion held in Ottawa, 
June 7 and 8, 1978, Canadian Study 54, Ottawa, the Conférence Board in Canada, 1978, 
152 p. 
19 MASLOVE and SWIMMER, op. cit. 
20 See AIB, op. cit., pp . 51-52; Financial Times, 16 February 1976; Toronto Star, 23 
February 1976. 
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Other indications of growing pressure for action were manifest during 
this period. The railway negotiations had broken down; boycotts and rallies 
became an increasing occurence; and several labour leaders were making 
comments similar to Shirley Carr's that the CLC was "actively consider-
ing" a one-day gênerai strike21. Finally, the CLC was scheduled to présent 
its annual mémorandum to the fédéral cabinet on 22 March, a ritual which 
had been recurring with peaceable regularity since before the turn of the 
century. However, the 1976 session had a marked différence: largely due to 
the organizing efforts of a group of Ottawa unionists, a large démonstra-
tion was planned, the enthusiasm for which initially surprised the Congress. 
On 22 March some 20,000 unionists arrived from across the country to de-
monstrate on Parliament Hill. Inside the Parliament Buildings Joe Morris 
took advantage of the heightened attention to lambaste the government for 
its "attack on working people", nevertheless reiterating that the Congress 
would cooperate with the government in developing policies to "solve the 
problems of inflation and unemployment and to set the economy on a basis 
from which ail groups can receive an équitable share of stable and sustained 
growth" — if controls were abandoned22. The next day the Congress ap-
peared to escalate the confrontation by declaring a "diplomatie freeze" on 
relations with the government, withdrawing its représentatives from the 
Economie Council of Canada and the Canada Labour Relations Council. 
In retrospect thèse events signalled the high point of officiai political 
militancy during the controls programme. In fact, while Morris uncloubted-
ly meant what he said during the présentation of the mémorandum, the as-
sembled cabinet ministers were well aware that the Congress's seemingly 
confrontational tactics were more a product of internai politics than they 
were a threat to the government's programme. Moreover, the ministers 
were appraised of this fact by a quite reliable source — the Congress leader-
ship itself. For there was a second dimension to the Congress' response to 
controls, a dimension which had purposely been kept quiet. In a séries of 
private meetings commencing shortly after the announcement of controls, 
Congress and government représentatives had been striving to reach an ac-
commodation on the controls issue. It is only in the context of this process 
that the émergence of the Manifesto can be understood. 
2i Ottawa Citizen, 16 February 1976; Toronto Star, 24 February 1976; Toronto Star 8 
March 1976; Montréal Gazette, 4 May 1976. 
22 CLC, Mémorandum to the Government of Canada, The Président's Introductory 
Remarks, 22 March 1976. 
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THE STRATEGY OF CORPORATISM: LABOUR'S MANIFESTO FOR 
CANADA 
The fédéral government's reaction to the CLC's response to controls 
was critically important in shaping the Congress leaders' subséquent think-
ing. Despite publicly scoffing at the CLC's fervent opposition, the govern-
ment was genuinely surprised at the intensity with which it was voiced. 
Among some senior civil servants and politicians there was real concern 
over the possibility of a gênerai strike and the conséquent political repercus-
sions. Additionally, there was concern that labour's hostility might impair 
the implementation of the promised "structural changes" during the 
breathing space provided by controls23. At the initiative of the government, 
then, three meetings with Congress représentatives were held within a 
month of the announcement of controls. During the course of thèse meet-
ings Congress leaders reiterated many of their by then standard complaints 
about the controls programme, essentially arguing that organized labour's 
participation in a voluntary programme was still contingent upon the adop-
tion of a significant portion of the ten-point programme. In addition, Con-
gress leaders stressed that the private sector unions would only participate if 
they were assured that public sector wages were adequately controlled. The 
government représentatives could not see their way clear to adopting the 
CLC's ten-point programme, and instead stressed the need for continuing 
consultations in view of the desirability of implementing structural changes 
for the "post-controls society". This thème was also pursued in informai 
discussions between the fédéral Department of Labour and the Congress in 
late 1975 and early 1976. 
Besides thèse discussions, several other indications convinced the Con-
gress leaders that a substantial shift in government policy direction was 
afoot: open spéculation in the média about Trudeau's plans for a "corpora-
tist society"; the speeches and public statements by such people as Ian 
Stewart and Bryce Mackasey, hinting at a corporatist strategy; and 
Trudeau's year-end interviews, in which he appeared to favour a much 
larger rôle for trade unions in économie policy. Ail thèse indications seemed 
to be in logical harmony with the apparent ascendancy of Galbraithianism 
in policy-making circles24. 
23 This thème was enunciated in Trudeau's announcement of the programme, and in the 
government's policy statement, Attack on Inflation: A Program of National Action, Policy 
Statement tabled in the House of Gommons by the Honourable Donald S. Macdonald, Minis-
ter of Finance, October 14, 1975, Ottawa, Department of Finance, 25 p. 
24 See in particular an article by Wayne C H E V A L D A Y O F F , Globe and Mail, 10 
December 1975. 
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The Congress and government représentatives met again on 9 March, 
at which time the CLC leaders made clear that the upcoming présentation of 
the mémorandum, and the accompanying démonstration, was an ''obliga-
tion''. Although the Congress was therefore forced to accommodate itself 
to the growing militancy of its members, the militancy was not entirely un-
welcome, since it demonstrated to the government that the reaction against 
controls was not simply confined to the labour leadership. In any case, at 
the 9 March meeting both sides agreed that the evolving discussions on post-
controls had been "fruitful" and were sufficiently promising to be con-
tinued. 
Labour's Manifesto for Canada25, then, was drafted in this context of 
conflicting pressures. The government appeared to be willing to initiate 
some manner of consultative process, a process which held the attraction of 
substantial labour input into state policy. But, simultaneously, significant 
pressure was emerging within labour's ranks to go beyond the relatively pas-
sive negativism which initially characterized the Congress's stance. The 
Manifesto was the Congress leadership's response. 
The Manifesto, on which work began in late December 1975, was pri-
marily the création of Ron Lang and Joe Morris. The Executive Council 
saw a draft in March, and between March and May the document was re-
fined and put into final form. The Executive Council was shown the final 
draft one week before the convention opened, and adopted it unanimously. 
On the evening of 16 May, the night before the Convention opened, the 
ranking officers met and were told of the Manifesto and its sister document, 
the Programme of Action for the first time. The documents were handed 
out to convention delegates only a short time before the debate actually 
started on Monday morning. 
The Manifesto contained two major interrelated thèmes — (1) an anal-
ysis of the économie situation and of the government's presumed policy 
directions, and (2) organized labour's stance with respect to both. The CLC 
essentially concurred with what it perceived to be the government's gênerai 
analysis of the économie situation: fiscal and monetary policies were not 
sufficient in the context of the 1970's and it was therefore necessary to bol-
ster thèse traditional "arm's length" policies with more direct intervention. 
However, the Manifesto argued that the current policies of the government 
— a combination of wage controls and cutbacks on social programmes — 
were inappropriate. And the Manifesto laid greatest stress on what it feared 
was a movement by the government towards "libéral corporatism": 
25 The Manifesto is contained in CLC, Eleventh Constitutional Convention, May 17-21, 
1976, Québec P.Q.: Report of Proceedings, 1976, pp. 8-13, 192 p. 
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Decontrols may mean a kind of libéral corporatism in which organized 
labour coopérâtes with the state and business to establish guidelines for 
our respective demands on the économie System and to détermine our 
respective shares. It may include a small dose of économie planning but 
is unlikely to involve more than systematizing the présent substantial but 
fragmented assistance provided to industry by government. 
Although the Manifesto rejected this libéral corporatist variant of tri-
partism, it advocated instead a System of tripartism which was termed 
"social corporatism"26. Social corporatism, it was argued, would hâve to be 
based on the abandonment of controls and the acceptance, by government 
and business, of tripartite arrangement "where only half the income équa-
tion, i.e. wages, is to be determined,, would be to use "the union organiza-
tion as an arm of both business and government to restrain the workers". In 
order to ensure the adoption of social tripartism, and to avoid being co-
opted into libéral corporatism, the Manifesto argued that wage controls 
would hâve to be successfully resisted; thus, "organized labour needs to 
develop national bargaining power to deal with the national economy man-
agers and a national social and économie programme — a bargaining posi-
tion". And this, in turn, would require the development of "collective 
strength" and a "coopérative and coordinated" effort; in other words, a 
more centralized structure, with an increase in the authority of the Congress 
executive to be formally exercised through the Executive Council. 
Linked to the Manifesto was a second policy document — the Pro-
gramme of Action. In the event that wage controls were not withdrawn, the 
Programme authorized the Executive Council "to organize and conduct a 
gênerai work stoppage, or stoppages, if and when necessary". Despite a 
good deal of criticism, both policies were passed by large majorities. 
In succeeding sections the Congress's pursuit of tripartism will be out-
lined. It is important hère to briefly summarize the main déterminants 
behind the émergence of the Manifesto. The core argument — that controls 
should be replaced with tripartite policy formulation, or social corporatism 
— stemmed from what may be termed the "leadership logic" of the Con-
gress. Congress leaders were caught between the horns of the classic dilem-
ma facing union leaders: to pur sue a militant course in opposing the state, 
especially in the absence of wholehearted and committed rank-and-file sup-
port, was to run the risk of losing whatever legitimacy and influence they al-
ready possessed vis-à-vis the government: but to capitulate to controls was 
equally unthinkable, for the leaders genuinely (and, as it turned out, cor-
26 During the course of the debate Joe Morris changed "social corporatism" to read 
"social democracy", ibid., p. 22. 
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rectly) believed that the policy was biased against the working class. With 
thèse routes closed off, the government's apparent intention to move 
towards tripartism, coupled with the obvious allure of participation in 
public policy formulation, turned the Congress leaders toward the option of 
tripartism. 
However, internai différences also shaped the Congress's strategy. Per-
haps the most serious challenge, at the time, was in dealing with the mili-
tants who were sure to be calling for a gênerai strike. The leadership antici-
pated and circumvented this by linking the Programme of Action to the 
Manifesto, and by their stage management of the convention. In addition, 
the likely fears of those opposed to voluntary restraint and to a centraliza-
tion of influence in the movement were, for the moment, stilled by avoiding 
explicit référence to wage restraint and by expressing the need for increased 
coordination in voluntary terms. 
THE GOVERNMENT REJECTS ' 'SOCIAL CORPORATISME 
Following the adoption of the Manifesto and the Programme of Action 
a séries of CLC-government meetings was quickly arranged. At the first of 
thèse meetings, on 17 June, the Congress presented the Manifesto as an al-
ternative to controls, but were told by the ministers that the proposais were 
too vague and, moreover, seemed to run counter to the principle of parlia-
mentary sovereignty. At a Congress Executive Committee meeting on 5-6 
July the government's objections were considered and a position paper was 
drafted27. In the position paper the Executive Committee attempted to dis-
pel the contention that tripartism was an infringement on parliamentary 
sovereignty by arguing that, just as parliament delegated authority to other 
bodies (such as marketing boards) it could delegate authority within certain 
terms of référence to a tripartite board or agency. Positively, the paper pro-
posed the establishment of a Council for Social and Economie Planning to 
serve as an umbrella body overseeing various subordinate boards and agen-
cies "which would be responsible to the Council and would be carrying out 
the administrative functions over the areas for which the Council had re-
sponsibility..." In the paper it was also suggested that one of labour's main 
concerns, the labour market, could be met by the formation of a Labour 
Market Board, with responsibility for labour market forecasting, training, 
mobility, immigration and unemployment insurance. In order to fulfill 
thèse responsibilities the CLC proposed that the Board "must hâve the 
27 CLC, Position Paper for the Meeting with the Prime Minister and Members of the 
Cabinet on July 12, 1976, 12 July 1976. 
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power and authority to channel investment funds, both public and private, 
or to hold back on proposed projects so that cyclical and régional unem-
ployment can be evened out". 
Finally, the Executive Committee addressed the minimum conditions 
under which the CLC would enter into a tripartite arrangement, of which 
there were two: "the removal of the présent wage controls", and "a com-
mitment by the government to legislate a tripartite structure' ' vested with 
certain powers, including: responsibility over income distribution (through 
an incomes policy), social policies (through active participation in such poli-
cy areas as pensions, workers' compensation, minimum wage levels, etc.), 
and the development of an industrial strategy. 
The position paper can clearly be interpreted as a response to the go-
vernment's objections; but it can also be seen to hâve been influenced by in-
ternai political considérations. Of chief concern was the issue of wage re-
straint, for, as a discussion paper (prepared for the Executive Committee) 
noted: 
We want a say over other forms of income including investment but we 
hâve not as yet acknowledged that we are also talking about labour's 
share of the national income. This is a question which we can expect the 
government to put to us and the political realities within the movement 
are such that this is the most tender area for the CLC to tackle12. 
Thus the position paper presented to the government stressed that although 
the CLC would be willing to "work in this area", it would only do so in the 
context of the overall proposai — the formation of a tripartite council re-
sponsible for investments and profits as well as wages. 
The 12 July meeting between the Congress and the government minis-
ters was largely taken up with the présentation of the Executive Commit-
tee's position paper. The ministers (privately) considered the position paper 
as "less radical" than the Manifesto and promised the CLC a response by 
early August. 
During this period pressure was mounting on the Congress to under-
take more concrète action in opposition to controls. Bitter strikes, directed 
at employers attempting to adhère to the AIB guidelines, or at the AIB it-
self, demonstrated that opposition to controls was still relatively strong. 
And several unions and union leaders continued their calls for a gênerai 
12 CLC, "The Manifesto and the Structure and Functions of Tripartism, Document for 
considération of the Executive Committee, July 5 and 6, 1976", 29 June 1976. 
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strike or other form of mass action29. In this context the CLC Executive 
Council met on 29 July to hear a report from the Executive Committee on 
the discussions with the government, and to consider what course of action 
to follow. 
The meeting focussed on several broad questions, including the mean-
ing of tripartism and the question of a gênerai strike. In regards to tripar-
tism a discussion paper written for the meeting noted that "from the many 
reports, discussions and conversations that hâve been filtering back to the 
Congress since the Québec convention it is becoming clear that some réser-
vations and uncertainty prevails at ail levels of the movement regarding the 
Manifesto"™. The discussion paper attempted to clarify the institutional 
implication of tripartism, summing it up as a demand for a "funclamental 
restructuring of Canada's institutions", with particular référence to the 
process of state policy-making. Furthermore, the paper suggested that tri-
partism would promote centralization of authority and power within the 
business community and the labour movement. The question of a gênerai 
strike was also reviewed, and was linked with the Manifesto: "The Trudeau 
government will not be moved unless confronted by power. Labour's power 
to conduct a successful national strike is also the kind of naked power which 
government respects. The national strike and the Manifesto are mutually 
dépendent objectives. Our opposition to wage controls is also the method 
for achieving the Manifesto.'" 
Despite the pressure for immédiate mass action — that is, the calling of 
a gênerai strike — Morris and the modérâtes on the Executive Council were 
successful in delaying a final décision until after the upcoming meeting with 
the cabinet. The hesitancy of the modérâtes was grounded in an unease over 
the legitimacy of a gênerai strike, in uncertainty over the reaction of em-
ployers, and in doubts concerning the likely response of the rank-and-file; 
the advocates of a gênerai strike were basing their position on the lack of 
success of the labour-government talks, pressure from sectors of the rank-
and-file, and the internai legitimacy of the labour leadership arising from 
their continued inaction. Thèse positions were resolved by delaying a final 
décision until the government responded to the CLC's position paper in 
August. 
On 6 August the CLC leaders again met with several cabinet ministers. 
The government représentatives did not reject the 17 July position paper out 
29 See Montréal Gazette, 31 May 1976, 14 June 1976, 12 July 1976; Montréal Star, 3 
June 1976 and 30 June 1976; Toronto Star, 11 June 1976, and 29 July 1976; Calgary Herald, 26 
June 1976; Financial Times, 19 July 1976. 
30 C L C , "Discussion Paper on the Manifesto and the Programme of Action for the Ex-
ecutive Council Mee t ing" , 29 July 1976. 
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of hand, but expressed hésitation, and a need to engage in "further consul-
tations". The CLC responded by suggesting that if the government would 
undertake to terminate the controls programme at a significantly earlier 
date than originally planned, then organized labour would not engage in 
any further pressure and would "cooperate" in post-controls arrangements 
along the lines set down by the Manifesîo. The government's response was 
that decontrol mechanisms would hâve to be developed and consented to 
before an end to controls could be announced. While the modérâtes on the 
CLC executive would probably hâve agreed to this — or, at least, would 
hâve agreed to a postponement of the calling of the Day of Protest — the 
government's position, emphasizing as it did the necessity to agrée to wage 
restraint above ail else, was impossible to meet. 
The Day of Protest was eventually held on 14 October and was at best a 
qualified success31. While approximately one million workers stayed off the 
job — an unprecedented political step in historical terms — it was suffi-
ciently disappointing for the CLC to squash any notion of a repeat perform-
ance. If the Day of Protest has attracted more support, the CLC could con-
ceivably hâve had its bargaining strength expanded; or if it had attracted 
less support, the Congress would hâve been discredited; however, as it turn-
ed out, the balance was left more or less the same. 
While the actions of the CLC following the May convention — the 
adoption of an explicitly position paper, and the subséquent termination of 
negotiations with the government under pressure from militant factions — 
seem relatively clearcut, it remains to explain the government's actions. It is 
tempting to conclude that the government's professed interest in "consulta-
tion" stemmed mainly from a strategy of forestalling labour militancy. This 
conclusion is lent some credence by the initiation of formai discussions with 
business leaders in September 1976, at a time when opposition to controls 
from this quarter was growing32. As well, the fédéral government working 
paper, The Way Ahead, published a few days prior to the Day of Protest, 
seemed in some respects considerably at odds with the assumptions animât -
ing the Manifesto. Finally, by the second half of 1976 the rate of inflation 
31 CRISPO, John, "Some Reflections on Canada's Wage and Price Controls", Labour 
and Society, vol. 2, no. 3, July 1977, pp. 253-267. 
32 Business reacted generally favourably to controls in the initial phase; but when the 
government attempted to tighten profit controls in 1976 (in an attempt to make the programme 
appear more équitable) support began to dwindle. The government's proposais were contained 
in Out Une of Proposée! Modifications in Price and Profit Guidelines under the Anti-Inflation 
Act, Ottawa, Department of Finance, May 1975. On business hostility to thèse proposais see 
AIB, op. cit., pp. 81-86; Toronto Star, 26 July 1976. The proposais were eventually softened 
and put into effect in September 1976. Another cause of business hostility was the spéculation 
about "corporatism" and about the need for more state intervention. 
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and wage settlements had declined perceptibly (a trend actually begun 
before controls were introduced: see Table 1). 
However, several groups within the government — particularly in the 
Department of Labour and the Privy Council Office — were convinced of 
the long-term benefits to be gained through the initiation of a "consultative 
process", if not of tripartism à la Manifesto. This, coupled with a continu-
ing though vague commitment to "structural reform" led the major policy-
making organ of cabinet, the Committee on Priorities and Planning, to 
décide in early November to proceed with consultation. 
AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE? THE CLC AND THE BCNI 
Following the government's décision to renew the consultative process, 
officiai contact was reestablished with the CLC, and the Congress Eïxecutive 
Committee again met with several cabinet ministers on 30 January 1977. At 
this meeting it was agreed that the issue of decontrols should be discussed 
on a tripartite basis, but when a February tripartite was suggested the CLC 
représentatives demurred and suggested a later date. The government also 
raised the possibility of introducing a System whereby public sector pay 
would in the future be based on comparisons with the private sector, a pro-
posai which the CLC rejected. As well, Trudeau agreed to respond formally 
to the CLC's 12 July 1976 proposai, and subsequently sent a letter to Morris 
proposing a multipartite advisory forum rather than a tripartite decision-
making body. 
Following the January meeting, CLC strategy took what seemed to be 
a strange twist. Several représentatives of the Congress met, in February 
and then in March, with représentatives of the Business Council on Nation-
al Issues33. The first of thèse meetings was exploratory, and designed to 
search for common ground. The discussants came to the conclusion that 
although they had considérable différences, they could at least agrée "that 
there could be some real value in getting together to develop a better under-
standing of each other's views. Also, if we could avoid the usual knee-jerk 
opposition to the views of the other side, it might be constructive in terms of 
the development of économie policy"34. From the perspective of the Con-
33 The business people involved in the government-business talks had decided to use the 
BCNI as a secrétariat to coordinate their participation. Subsequently, the BCNI acted as the 
central business organization in the consultations. The CLC-BCNI meeting was arranged 
through the C D . Howe Research Institute, which limited its participation to arranging the 
meeting. 
34 The comment is Alfred Powis' (of Noranda) in CONFERENCE BOARD IN 
CANADA, op. cit., p. 38. 
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gress, Ron Lang saw three purposes in pursuing a "business-labour dia-
logue": to "make an end run around the government by meeting with the 
same business group with which the government was holding discussions"; 
to "achieve a business/labour position of opposition to wage controls"; 
and, to "begin a permanent dialogue between the CEO's of the business 
world and the leadership of the labour movement"35. 
The CLC-BCNI meeting on 18-19 March produced more substantive 
results. Although the first day of discussions involved an expected degree of 
fencing and attempts to blâme the other group for the controls programme, 
the second day saw the émergence of a common position which shifted 
blâme onto the government's doorstep. The newly-found common position 
revolved around two proposais: an immédiate end to controls; and the créa-
tion of a "meaningful ongoing bipartite and tripartite relationship"36. This 
position was presented to Trudeau the following week, and shortly after-
ward the first full-fledged tripartite meeting was scheduled for 22 April. 
The 22 April meeting was largely taken up with the government's pré-
sentation of a Green Paper (eventually released as Agenda for Coopéra-
tion). The government took the position that an immédiate end to controls 
was only possible if business and labour undertook to exercise voluntary re-
straint. Additionally, a tripartite or multipartite monitoring agency would 
be established and public sector wages would continue to be controlled in 
order that they neither "fall behind nor get ahead of" private sector wages. 
The BCNI and CLC représentatives took issue with thèse proposais, reiter-
ating their demand for an immédiate abandonment of controls "with no 
strings attached". The labour représentatives in particular stressed that the 
form of voluntary restraint envisaged by the government was impossible: 
"This was obviously an approach to which we could not agrée, because it 
would be replacing government controls with a System of trade union con-
trols, and we refused to enter into a discussion on this question, as did busi-
ness."37 
In line with Trudeau's earlier proposai to Joe Morris, the government 
also proposed the establishment of a multipartite consultative forum com-
posed of 40-50 people, stressing, however, that responsibility for public 
35 LANG, op. cit. 
36 B A R C L A Y , Ian, "No te s for an A d d r e s s " to the Conférence Board in C a n a d a ' s Con-
férence on Consultation and Advocacy: Influencing Public Policy, Ot tawa, November 20, 
1979. 
37 Report on Tripartite Meeting, Ottawa, April 22, 1977, appended to letter dated 20 
May 1977, Morris to Ranking Officers of Affiliated Organizations, Executive Council, Provin-
cial Fédérations of Labour, Labour Councils, CLC Régional Directors and Staff. 
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policy must be retained by the government. To this proposai the CLC also 
responded negatively, arguing that the body should be tripartite and that 
the persons on the body should be considered as "institutional représenta-
tives": "To labour, consultation means that we should hâve people who are 
able to reflect the position of those they represent."38 
On 26 April représentatives of the Congress and the BCNI met to con-
sider their next move. During this meeting, or shortly thereafter, a joint re-
sponse to the government's position was drafted and arrangements were 
made to meet with Trudeau. Joe Morris and Peter Gordon (of Stelco) pre-
sented the document to Trudeau in a private meeting on 16 May. On the key 
question of the termination of controls, the BCNI-CLC position was still 
that controls should be ended instantaneously; and, on the government's 
demand for a pledge of voluntary restraint, Morris and Gordon went fur-
ther than either had before: 
This consensus (to terminate controls immediately) is supported by our 
undertaking to make voluntary efforts to make de-control work... We 
ourselves are prepared to make personal commitments and seek to per-
suade others that this collective action is in the interests of Canada39. 
Finally, on the issue of the proposed monitoring agency, Morris and 
Gordon proposed a tripartite agency headed by a three member board, em-
powered to "solicit information and exercise moral suasion, but without 
authority for roll-back or for establishing guidelines". The agency would be 
"responsible to the public for scrutinizing price increases and wage settle-
ments" and "should terminate as early as possible but no later than Decem-
ber31, 1978". 
Trudeau had several objections regarding the proposed monitoring 
agency: that the agency should issue guidelines; that its proposed life span 
was too short; and that it should be a "public interest" board rather than a 
représentative tripartite board. Morris and Gordon also urged Trudeau to 
ensure that their position was taken into account in the soon-to-be-released 
Agenda for Coopération; however, it had already been printed and ail 
Trudeau could say was that the BCNI-CLC position would be "taken 
seriously" in the upcoming negotiations. 
The Congress's position, between January and May, had undergone a 
significant shift: the emphasis of the Manifesto and the 12 July 1976 posi-
tion paper on "decision-making" and "equal power sharing", had been 
38 Ibid. 
39 Termination of Controls. Statement signed by Joe Morris and Peter Gordon. No date 
(May 1977?). 
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replaced by an emphasis on "advice" and * 'consultation". Additionally, 
Morris's private commitment to Trudeau concerning voluntary decontrol 
was a significant, if somewhat vague, concession. This shift was partially 
the resuit of the government's continued intransigence, but more impor-
tantly stemmed from the alliance with the BCNI (since business leaders con-
sistently stressed that they had no désire to assume any policy or administra-
tive responsibilities). The CLC's position, however, was also shaped by 
internai différences of opinion, primarily over the issue of voluntary 
restraint40; thus Congress représentatives argued that, although some form 
of voluntary restraint commitment might be given to the government, this 
could only occur in the context of a withdrawal of wage controls and the in-
stitution of some form of consultative body. However, the pursuit oî social 
corporatism had clearly been abandoned. 
THE DISINTEGRATION OF CONSENSUS 
The next step in the process was the release of Agenda for Coopéra-
tion^ outlining the government's position with respect to controls and con-
sultation. Through the bureaucratie prose may be discerned a response to 
the BCNI-CLC position. The Agenda laid great stress on the necessity to 
reduce inflation (which was then rising despite declining wage settlements), 
and thus argued that "real incomes will hâve to grow more slowly. Indeed, 
the increase in real income per capita may hâve to be less than the growth in 
average productivity"42. More important, the Agenda outlined the major 
conditions for an instantaneous (as opposed to phased) end to controls: that 
a représentative monitoring agency, with business and labour participation, 
would be established to "scrutinize" wage and price movements; that an 
answer to what "precisely would constitute voluntary restraint" would hâve 
to be arrived at; and that commitments to adhère to this would hâve to be 
made by business and labour. The Agenda also reiterated the government's 
intention to institute a scheme of pubic sector wage restraint based on com-
parability. Finally, on the issue of the "consultative process", the govern-
ment proposed a 40-50 person multipartite forum, with no policy- or 
decision-making rôle. 
From the perspective of the Congress, the message was starkly clear: 
the sine qua non for an immédiate and instantaneous abandonment of con-
40 See below. 
4i CANADA, Agenda for Coopération: A Discussion Paper on De-Control and Post-
Control Issues, Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services, 1977, 63 p. 
42 Ibid., p. 8. 
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trois was a pledge of voluntary restraint; and there was to be no substantive 
labour or business participation in the exercise of state power. 
It should be noted that the government's stubborness was not the only 
problem facing the proponents of tripartism among the Congress leadership 
at this time. General uneasiness within the movement began to make itself 
felt as early as during the CLC-cabinet talks in the summer of 1976. Follow-
ing the Day of Protest, more overt opposition appeared — for example, at 
the Saskatchewan and Ontario Fédérations of Labour conventions43. This 
early opposition focussed on several aspects of tripartism: the potential im-
pairment of the CLC-NDP relationship: the possibility of CLC acqui-
escence to a voluntary incomes policy; the centralization of power in the 
movement implied by the Manifesto; and the possibility of leadership "co-
optation". Thèse criticisms were addressed by the proponents of tripartism 
at an Executive Committee "Think-In" and at a subséquent Executive 
Council meeting in December 1976, the outcome being that the pro-
tripartism faction was successful in regenerating support for — or at least 
preventing the unceremonious abandonment of — the Manifesto and the 12 
July position paper44. 
During early 1977 the opposition did not dissipate: CUPW leaders were 
making speeches harshly critical of the CLC's pursuit of tripartism; the 
CSN was advocating a work stoppage for 14 October and was criticizing the 
CLC for "giving up the fight"; an économie statement opposing tripartism 
was passed (over the objections of the leadership) at a Steelworkers conven-
tion in May; and several CUPE provincial divisions were debating the issue 
of tripartism and voting on resolutions explicitly repudiating any support45. 
While the pro-tripartite faction was not taking thèse criticisms lying down46, 
they were well aware of the continuing dissension over the issue and recog-
nized that their bargaining position was accordingly circumscribed. 
On 22 July a particularly important meeting was held. The meeting was 
of a tripartite subcommittee (appointed at the 22 April meeting) charged 
with discussing the issue of the consultative forum and the question of re-
présentation. Although the subcommittee reached agreement on several 
43 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 30 October 1976; Globe and Mail, 23 November 1976. 
44 G O N I C K , Cy, " O n the Road to T r ipa r t i sm" , Canadian Dimension, vol. 12, no . 1, 
January 1977; C L C , "Discussion on the Manifesto for the T h i n k - I n ' of the Executive Com-
mittee, December 7 & 8, 1976, Toron to , O n t a r i o " , December 1976. 
45 See CUPW, vol. 7, no . 4 , June 1977; Toronto Star, 23 May 1977; Canadian Press 
Télex, 5 May 1977 and 9 June 1977. 
46 See, for example, J . M O R R I S , Speech to the Canadian Délégation of the 25th Consti-
tutional Convention of the United Autoworkers by Joe Morris, Président of the Canadian 
Labour Congress, Los Angeles, California, 18 May 1977. 
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matters — notably, the size of the proposed forum (30), the government's 
participation (the Prime Minister and five "économie" ministers), the use 
of the Economie Council of Canada in a staff capacity, and several procé-
dural issues — there was a différence of opinion on two broad sets of con-
sidérations. On the question of représentation the CLC and BCNI were 
each seeking a representational monopoly, and were demanding (at the in-
sistence of the CLC) that the forum be tripartite rather than multipartite. 
The government, for its part, remained opposed to granting representa-
tional monopolies to the CLC and BCNI, and remained insistent that the 
body be multipartite. On the question of the substantive matters with which 
the body would deal, and the powers which it would exercise, the CLC-
BCNI représentatives argued that the body should meet regularly to review 
économie policy and should be empowered to review pertinent draft législa-
tion. The government représentatives were not opposed to the forum con-
sidering économie policy, but their emphasis was on generating a consensus 
or commitment to the government's budget plans rather than on giving the 
body a rôle in policy formulation. As well, the government rejected the idea 
of empowering the body to review draft législation, trotting out the worn 
argument that this would infringe upon "parliamentary sovereignty". 
On 29 July the second formai tripartite session was held, and again the 
meeting was largely taken up with a government proposai. The government 
proposed that a phased de-control process could begin as of 14 October / / 
"there is a reasonable degree of assurance that this will not lead to any in-
terruption of our progress in bringing down the rate of inflation"47. In addi-
tion the government proposai "invited" business and labour to "commit 
themselves" to voluntary restraint, which was defined as ensuring "that the 
increase in money incomes and priées charged by business be lower than is 
provided by the guidelines in force for this year"48. The voluntary restraint 
programme was to be supervised by a monitoring agency, and the govern-
ment indicated that it "would ensure that people of stature with recognized 
expérience in business and labour would be included"49. Finally, a 30-
member consultative forum would be established, of which ten would be 
from the business community (five from the BCNI), ten from organized 
labour (six of which would be chosen "in consultation with" the CLC), five 
from "other interest groups", and five government ministers. 
47 C A N A D A , Decontrol and Post-Control Arrangements, Statement by the Govern-
ment of Canada to Business and Labour Leaders, Ot tawa, Depar tment of Finance 29 July 
1977. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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It will be noticed that the government's position had altered somewhat 
on the issue of voluntary restraint. As a conséquence of the Department of 
Finance's imposition of a "hard line", the government had dropped its of-
fer of an instantaneous (rather than phased) end to controls, even if a. vol-
untary restraint agreement could hâve been worked out. In addition, Con-
gress and BCNI participants hâve claimed that the government's tone dur-
ing the meetings on 22 June and 29 July indicated a staunch refusai to bend 
any further; government participants, however, hâve claimed that the 29 
July proposai was only a bargaining position open to further négociation50. 
In any case, the 29 July meeting represented the end of this round of at-
tempts to institute tripartism. Although following the 29 July meeting the 
BCNI urged Congress leaders not to reject the government's proposai out 
of hand, the pro-tripartite group in the CLC was sufficiently weakened by 
the government's apparent hard line on voluntary restraint to spell the end 
of the current effort. In early August, the Executive Council of the Con-
gress adopted a position paper outlining its position51. The CounciPs posi-
tion paper was ratified by the ranking officers on 17 August. 
The Council's position should be interpreted with care. It is obvious 
that the government's hardened terms antagonized even some of the sup-
porters of voluntary restraint, whom clearly did not think that the govern-
ment's position was negotiable. The most critical factor, then, was the gov-
ernment's position on voluntary restraint, which undermined the support of 
those pressing for a continuation of discussions. Additionally, the govern-
ment's proposai for a scheme of public sector wage détermination through 
"comparability" could not be accepted. But it is important to notice that 
the Council did not reject the aim of tripartism; indeed, the statement reiter-
ated the demand for a Council for Social and Economie Planning (including 
a Labour Market Board). Thus, those broadly opposed to tripartism were 
not successful in having the policy abandoned; although they had an impact 
through their gênerai criticisms of tripartism, the spécifie résistance to vol-
untary restraint ran much deeper52. 
50 See the comments of T . Shoyama, the then — Deputy Minister of Finance, in CON-
F E R E N C E B O A R D IN C A N A D A , op. cit., p . 83. 
51 C L C , Position Paper of the Executive Council, 11 August 1977. 
52 Several additional factors contributed to organized labour ' s distrust of the govern-
ment during this period: the threat to legislate striking air traffic controllers back to work; the 
révélation of the existence of a Solicitor General 's "b lack l i s t " of union officiais; and the récent 
tightening of the UIC régulations. See Toronto Star, 23 August 1977. 
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THE FATE OF TRIPARTISM 
Tripartism was a notion, a concept. I see nothing wrong with it. It got a 
lot of people excited, who normally get excited about things that are 
none of their dammed business. 
Those people in universities, who hâve nothing better to do than poke 
their noses into other people's business, they're the people who really 
destroyed the tripartite concept, gave it a sinister connotation before 
anyone had a chance to even try it out. (Dennis McDermott, 8 May 
1978) 
Despite the new CLC president's dissembling, the issue of tripartism 
did not sink into oblivion following the termination of the 1977 negotia-
tions. Indeed, on one level it became more prominent as the failure served 
to intensify opposition within the Congress between August 1977 and the 
April 1978 convention. And on another level, Congress leaders, the BCNI 
and some groups within the fédéral government continued to work toward 
increasing business and labour input into state policy-making. This latter ef-
fort — which is still underway — is being pursued with far less fanfare than 
the discussions around wage controls in 1975-78. Tripartism — by whatever 
name — seems not to hâve lost its allure. 
During the autumn of 1977 open opposition to tripartism began to sur-
face. Delegates at the provincial labour fédération conventions in Québec, 
Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia voted against the 
strategy of tripartism53. Individual unions also joined this wave or protest 
— the most notable being CUPE54. And, by the spring an extraordinarily 
large number of resolutions condemning tripartism were being received by 
the Congress for debate at the upcoming convention. The supporters of tri-
partism — Joe Morris being the most out-spoken — attempted to mount a 
defence, but the momentum seemed to be running in the opposite direction. 
The Congress leadership, however, was determined to prevent tripar-
tism being excised from their range of options. Thus, at the April 1978 con-
vention several stratégies were adopted to circumvent the expected opposi-
tion. First, well before the convention the ranking officers were consulted 
on the policy papers being prepared. This exercise was presumably mounted 
in an attempt to meet opposition before the convention; and indeed, in 
53 See Labour Gazette, vol. 78, no. 1, Januray 1978, p. 17 and no. 2, February 1978, p. 
2; Winnipeg Tribune, 26 September 1977; Canadian Press Télex, 2 November 1977. 
54 See C U P E , " A n Agenda for A c t i o n " , Policy Statements: 77 Convention, Ot tawa, 
CUPE, 1977; and John CLARKE, "Does CUPE's Décision Spell the End of Tripartism?", 
Labour Gazette, vol. 78, no. 1, January 1978. 
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March the ranking officers insisted on the removal of a référence to a pro-
posed Labour Market Board, a décision indicative of the continuing feeling 
against (or at least sensitivity to) the issue of tripartism. Second, the officiai 
policy paper studiously avoided référence to tripartism, focusing instead on 
the need for "social démocratie planning" and an "industrial strategy". 
Many of the documents contained oblique références to the desirability of 
institutional change, however it was An Economie, Political, and Industrial 
Strategy for Labour55 which most carefully treaded the line between tripar-
tism and "planning": repeatedly the document emphasized that "social and 
économie planning" was a legitimate objective; that labour should develop 
its power "on ail fronts and at ail levels"; and that the unilatéral power of 
capital should be attenuated. However, nowhere does the document state 
the mechanisms through which those objectives were to be achieved. 
During the convention itself the leadership advanced a particular line 
which ultimately proved successful. It was admitted that tripartism had so 
far failed; that is, as a strategy to bring about an end to wage controls, tri-
partism had failed. But as an option to be possibly pursued in the future, 
tripartism was not ruled out. In his presidential address, Joe Morris argued 
that the Congress policy outlined in An Economie, Political and Industrial 
Strategy for Labour "concentrâtes on building up the power of the CLC 
and the trade union movement, but leaves the mechanism for exercising the 
power to be developed in the fullness of time and as the occasion warrants. 
It therefore alters the Manifesto, in that it does not tie the movement to a 
single decision-making structure such as tripartism"56. But tripartism was 
not to be ruled out, for as Morris added, "It is obvious the Congress must 
use any and every opportunity to advance the cause of our people in the 
économie, social and political sphère." Finally, the explicit criticism aimed 
at tripartism in the form of resolutions was successfully deflected through 
the skillful — although transparent — drafting of a composite resolution 
which admitted that tripartism had failed, but avoided repudiating it as a 
long-term goal57. 
Since the 1978 convention the debate within the Congress over the issue 
of tripartism has ail but disappeared. This has been partly due to the leader-
ship's banishment of the word from the Congress's approved lexicon, and 
due to the secrecy shrouding récent developments (see below). More impor-
tant^, the end of wage controls in 1978 broke the associative link between 
the replacement of controls with voluntary restraint and the development of 
tripartite and bipartite forums. Thus, although several left groupings at-
55 In CLC, Twelfth Constitutional Convention, April 3-7, 1978, Québec, P.Q.: Report 
of Proceedings, 1978, 233 p . , pp . 12-16. 
56 Ibid., p. 4 . 
57 Ibid., pp . 93-94. 
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tempted to raise the issue of tripartism and Congress-business initiatives at 
the 1980 convention58, the absence of any overt threat to free collective bar-
gaining sapped the critique of the force it possessed during controls. 
While internai dissension has, since the 1978 convention, been stilled, it 
is important to see why the Congress leaders clung so tenaciously to the tri-
partite option. The reason is simply that tripartism remains very much on 
the agenda. Even before the April 1978 convention the Congress appeared 
to be scoring some small gains: the government offered the CLC a consulta-
tive rôle in the GATT negotiations; the powers of the planned post-controls 
monitoring agency were reduced under pressure from the Congress and 
other groups59; organized labour was offered a rôle in the ITC-sponsored 
sectoral task forces created to examine problems in several manufacturing 
sectors; and the government — particularly the Minister of Labour — con-
tinued to propound the notion of consultation60. 
Of thèse events the création of the sector task force exercise was per-
haps the most important, for it seems to hâve born fruit with a flavour simi-
lar to the Manifeste*. The twenty-three task forces (together known as 
"Tier-1") finished their reports and forwarded them to a "Second Tier 
Committee" which was to "identify and make recommendations about fac-
tors and policies that eut across sector lines... and to pull together the com-
mon threads running through the reports to make recommendations on 
broad économie policy"61. 
Two events associated with the Tier I and II process are important62. 
First, stemming from the Tier II report was the création of a "Major Pro-
jects Task Force" comprised of business and labour représentatives and 
supported by the government. The Task Force's purpose, according to Ron 
Lang, is to "examine ail major projects coming on stream in the next 
décade with the view to recommending policies to maximize Canadian con-
tent, both in the construction phase and in long-term down-stream benefits 
to strengthen secondary manufacturing and to create jobs"63. Although not 
much is known about the Task Force's work it is indicative of a continuing 
enthusiasm among CLC and business leaders to hâve a more direct and 
58 The author attended the convention and saw the efforts at first hand. 
59 Financial Post, 18 February 1976. 
60 See, for example, John M u n r o ' s comments in Financial Post, 26 November 1977. 
6i A Report by the Second Tier Committee on Policies to Improve Canadian Competi-
tiveness, Ot tawa, Depar tment of Industry, Trade and Commerce , October 1978, 34 p . , p . 2. 
62 For a more extensive t reatment of the following topics see "Sl ipping in the Back 
Door : Tripart ism Today — Corporat ism T o m o r r o w ? " , Canadian Dimension, vol. 15, n o . 3 , 
December 1980, p p . 30-36. 
63 LANG, op. cit., p. 12. 
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joint input into state policy. The second significant development stemming 
from the Tier II process in the development of a joint CLC-BCNI proposai 
for the formation of a national manpower body64. Although this too has not 
garnered much publicity, the proposai calls for a bipartite agency (i.e. 
BCNI-CLC) supported financially by fédéral and provincial governments. 
The manpower body would presumably be expected to hâve a significant 
impact on public policy. 
Thèse developments indicate that the Congress continues to be com-
mitted to advancing the rôle of organized labour, and the Congress's rôle, 
into the field of public policy formation. While caution has replaced brash-
ness, the essential goal has not undergone much change. Moreover, there 
appears to exist considérable sympathy for this agenda within the govern-
ment65, and on the part of the Congress's newfound allies in the business 
community. 
CONCLUSION 
It is unremarkable that the Congress leadership desires more input into 
public policy; the reverse would indeed be remarkable. However, the will-
ingness of governments generally to offer trade union confédérations more 
power, that is, some form of tripartism, has not stemmed from a sudden 
change of heart concerning the legitimacy of working class organizations. 
Rather, tripartism has been intimately and directly associated with the ob-
jective of achieving wage restraint. The position of the fédéral government, 
from the Turner consensus exercise to the breakdown in negotiations in the 
summer of 1977, hinged on the argument that any significant concessions to 
organized labour would hâve to be met with a commitment to voluntary re-
straint. The CLC leaders could not meet this condition. Despite the shift 
away from the explicitly corporatist vision of the Manifesto, opposition 
within the Congress — emanating from groups opposed to the broad con-
ception of tripartism, and from those concerned to avoid a voluntary com-
mitment to restraint — was sufficiently strong to prevent the Congress 
leaders from acquiescing. 
Corporatism, or even a milder form of tripartism, thus did not become 
established in Canada during the period of controls; and developments 
since, while not without meaning, hâve not represented a significant ad-
vance in this direction. While the immédiate cause of the "failure" was the 
64 See Globe and Mail, 30 April 1980. 
65 Especially within the Departments of Labour, and Industry, Trade and Commerce, 
and the Ministry of State for Economie Development. 
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conflicting stances which emerged in the process of negotiations, thèse 
should be interpreted somewhat more broadly. Three main factors may be 
suggested hère66. First, the ideological complexion of the party in power — 
the Libérais — was not well suited to tripartism. Although social démo-
cratie governments hâve not held a monopoly on corporatist initiatives, 
their political reliance on organized labour and ideological commitment to 
full employment is generally more conducive to a corporatist strategy to 
contain wage militancy. Second, the political influence of the CLC, for a 
range of historical reasons, has never been great. This has not only contrib-
uted to the NDP's relative weakness, but has also meant that governments 
hâve not had to pay the CLC's position as close attention as might other-
wise be the case. Third, authority in the CLC is comparatively decentral-
ized67, which has meant that Congress leaders hâve not possessed enough in-
ternai influence to override the policy objections of the larger affiliâtes. 
Despite thèse — and other68 — formidable barriers, the issue of tripar-
tism has not withered away. The broad économie conditions which prompt 
considération of incomes policies continue to exist. In a récent speech un-
cannily reminiscent of speeches made by John Monro in the mid- to late-
seventies, the présent fédéral Minister of Labour, Gerald Regan, has raised 
the issue again: 
Keeping in mind the fiercely compétitive économie environment that is 
emerging... you can well appreciate the need for more sophisticated 
consultative structures that bring the économie partners together to dis-
cuss projects and priorities, exchange information, set économie targets, 
and generally décide on the future direction of économie policy69. 
In the présent context of high inflation and rising wage settlements70, his-
tory may well repeat itself in the form of an attempt to gain voluntary re-
straint, accompanied by the quidpro quo of tripartism — undoubtedly suit-
ably renamed. Several factors make présent circumstances more favourable 
than in the past — the current participation of many labour leaders in con-
66 See Léo P A N I T C H , op. cit., and idem, "Corpo ra t i sm in C a n a d a " , Studies in Politi-
cal Economy, vol. 1, p p . 43-92. 
67 For a comparat ive study see John W I N D M U L L E R , " T h e Author i ty of Nat ional 
Trade Union Confédérat ions: A Compara t ie Ana lys i s" , in David B. LIPSKY (éd.), Union 
Power and Public Policy, I thaca, New York, ILR/Corne l l , p p . 71-107. 
68 For example, P A N I T C H , "Corpora t i sm in C a n a d a " , op. cit., mentions the fédéral 
system of government in Canada , which may help explain corporat is t developments at the p ro-
vincial level, on which see "Sl ipping in the Back D o o r . . . " , op. cit. 
69 R E G A N , Gerald, " N o t e s for an Address by the Minister of Labour , the Honourab le 
Gerald A . Regan, P . C . , Q . C . , M . P . , to the Second Canad ian Convent ion of the Building and 
Construct ion Trades Depar tment ; Calgary Convent ion Centre , Calgary, Alberta , July 14, 
1980", Ot tawa, Depar tment of Labour , 1980. 
70 See Financial Post, 3 January 1981. 
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sultative exercises, the believability of controls in light of the previous pro-
gramme, the advocacy of tripartism by various components of the fédéral 
government. However, the inescapably important question which the 
labour movement will hâve to confront remains unchanged: should a com-
mitment to wage restraint be traded for a possibly ethereal increased influ-
ence over public policy? The question requires careful, and démocratie, 
considération. 
Le Congrès du travail du Canada et le tripartisme 
Quels sont les événements et le processus qui ont entouré le débat sur le contrôle 
des revenus et le tripartisme au Canada, principalement en ce qui a trait aux politi-
ques et aux stratégies du Congrès du travail du Canada? 
Le tripartisme peut avoir plusieurs sens. Par exemple, il peut revêtir l'aspect 
d'une structure institutionnelle qui consisterait, pour le mouvement syndical, les 
groupements d'employeurs et le gouvernement, à mettre au point conjointement les 
politiques qu'ils désirent appliquer en certains secteurs et à s'assurer que ces ententes 
sont acceptées. Il peut aussi ne consister qu'en des discussions à trois sans autre objet 
que d'échanger des points de vue. Le premier type de tripartisme se rapproche du 
«corporatisme». On interprète les initiatives en vue d'établir le tripartisme comme si 
elles étaient surtout associées aux efforts du gouvernement pour s'assurer le contrôle 
des salaires. 
L'article traite ensuite de l'origine, du fonctionnement et du résultat des débats 
sur le tripartisme au cours de la période de l'application du programme de contrôle 
des prix et des salaires de 1976 à 1978. Il décrit aussi les efforts qui ont été faits en vue 
d'instituer une politique volontaire de restriction des revenus avant l'imposition des 
contrôles ainsi que des événements majeurs qui ont suivi la période des contrôles. 
Durant cette période, le gouvernement fédéral s'est montré disposé à accorder 
des concessions aux employeurs et aux dirigeant syndicaux en retour de leur engage-
ment à restreindre les hausses de revenus. Même si les concessions proposées par le 
gouvernement et les formes d'engagement qu'il souhaitait ont varié beaucoup, il faut 
conclure que l'on ne peut tendre au tripartisme que dans la mesure où le mouvement 
syndical accepte les contraintes qu'il veut et qu'il est capable de les faire appliquer. 
D'une façon générale, le Congrès du travail au Canada a fait pression pendant 
toute la durée du programme de contrôles pour que le gouvernement les abandonne 
et les remplace par une forme quelconque de tripartisme. Cette pression découle de 
plusieurs facteurs. L'action des forces sociales a amené le gouvernement à établir une 
politique de contrôles. À l'intérieur de ce contexte, le désir des dirigeants du Congrès 
du travail du Canada d'obtenir le retrait des contrôles aussi bien que leur volonté 
d'exercer une influence plus grande sur le gouvernement et sur le mouvement ouvrier 
lui-même les incita à suggérer le tripartisme. Finalement, le consentement du gouver-
nement à remplacer les contrôles par une certaine forme de consultation porta les 
dirigeants syndicaux à estimer que cette stratégie en valait la peine. 
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Bien que la stratégie d'ensemble du Congrès du travail du Canada soit demeurée 
stable pendant toute la période des contrôles, plusieurs changements se sont pro-
duits. Ces modifications résultent de trois groupes d'éléments. En premier lieu, les 
politiques du gouvernement fédéral ont eu un poids considérable principalement à 
cause de son insistance auprès du Congrès du travail du Canada pour que celui-ci 
s'engage dans une politique de restriction volontaire des salaires. Deuxièmement, le 
point de vue des dirigeants du Congrès du travail du Canada a influencé les milieux 
d'affaires, ce qui a entraîné comme conséquence leur alliance contre le gouverne-
ment. Enfin, l'opposition au tripartisme de la part de différents groupes à l'intérieur 
de la centrale syndicale a une influence marquée en limitant la possibilité de faire cer-
taines concessions au gouvernement. L'importance de ces facteurs a varié selon les 
époques, mais ils ont joué continuellement. 
On peut conclure que la tendance au tripartisme est reliée à la politique du con-
trôle des revenus de la part du gouvernement. Les perspectives de développement du 
tripartisme au Canada, du moins au niveau du gouvernement fédéral, sont soumises 
à trois contraintes spéciales: l'idéologie de deux des principaux partis politiques fédé-
raux, la faiblesse relative du Congrès du travail du Canada dans le domaine politique 
et la structure décentralisée du pouvoir au sein du mouvement syndical. 
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